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Abstract: 
 
This paper presents a simple two-period, dual economy model in which migration options 
may affect the informal financing of educational investments.  When credit contracts are 
universally available and perfectly enforceable, spatially varied returns to human capital 
have no effect on educational investment patterns.  But when financial markets are 
incomplete and informal mechanisms subject to imperfect contract enforcement must fill 
the breach, spatial inequality in infrastructure or other attributes that affect the returns to 
education create spatial differentiation in educational lending and consequently, in 
educational attainment.  Although migration options can increase the returns to 
education, they can also choke off the informal finance on which poorer rural households 
depend for long-term, lumpy investments like children’s education. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The positive relationship between education and expected future income is well 
established (Schultz 1988, Strauss et al. 1995, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995, 
Psacharopoulos 1985).  Yet, despite clear evidence of strong returns to education, many 
communities exhibit low rates of educational attainment, especially in rural areas of the 
developing world (Singh 1992, Psacharopoulos 1985).  One reason for the apparent 
underinvestment in children's education is imperfect financial markets that ration poorer 
households out of the formal market for long-term loans.  As Loury (1981) showed, when 
formal financial markets fail, the logical consequence is not only underinvestment in 
education but also, derivatively, the propagation of poverty from one generation to the 
next.  Credit market failures, coupled with costly education, limit the poor’s ability to 
purchase optimal levels of education.  The relationship between education and income is 
thus reversed, generating a poverty trap whereby the poor attain low levels of education 
due to financial constraints and consequently can expect meager future earnings due to 
educational deficiencies. 
Why, however, don't informal financial markets spring up to fill the educational 
financing gap when formal markets fail?  Elaborate informal credit and insurance 
mechanisms exist between households, providing finance not available through formal 
financial institutions (Udry 1993, Townsend 1994, Besley 1995, Morduch 1995).  Given 
the high apparent returns to education and widespread anecdotal evidence of informal 
financing of others' education, one naturally wonders why informal financial transactions 
do not resolve the educational investment problem in rural areas of developing countries.   
This paper offers an answer to that puzzle.  We show that in the presence of 
financial market imperfections associated with imperfect credit contract enforcement, 
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spatial variation in the returns to education can induce migration decisions that rationally 
choke off the informal financing of education in relatively disadvantaged areas. When 
financial markets are complete and perfect, spatially varied returns to human capital have 
no effect on educational investment patterns, and they are then Pareto optimal.  But when 
formal financial markets are incomplete and credit contracts must be self-enforcing, 
spatial inequality in infrastructure and other attributes that increase the returns to 
education create spatial differentials in educational lending and, consequently, greater 
geographic and wealth-based variation in educational attainment than would otherwise 
occur. 
The important innovation of this paper is to link the literature on spatially varied 
productivity and migration with that on informal finance..  The extensive literature on 
migration emphasizes how spatially varied infrastructure, law enforcement, access to 
lucrative markets and other attributes creates a gradient across space in real returns to 
education (Banerjee et al. 1998, Stark 1984, Todaro 1997, Williamson 1988).  Migration 
to areas with greater community endowments is an especially attractive option for 
educated persons living in relatively disadvantaged rural areas with few opportunities for 
skilled employment (Barnum and Sabot 1975, Schultz 1988).  One of the most consistent 
findings in this literature is of the positive relationship between educational attainment 
and rural-urban migration (Todaro, 1997).   
On the other hand, the literature on informal finance identifies the close-knit 
associations of traditional communities as the ‘social capital’ that allows for the provision 
of financial services in informal settings (Stiglitz 1991, Besley et al. 1993).  Lenders can 
access relatively cheap information on potential borrowers due to highly personalized 
intra-community relationships.  They can also assure repayment by the credible threat of 
 4
social sanctions: a borrower who is visibly able to pay but neglects his loan commitment 
will signal dishonesty, thereby eroding his stock of social capital within the community.   
Contract enforcement, however, becomes more difficult the farther the 
contracting parties are from each other.  Tracking down debtors becomes costly and as 
their interaction with the community is diminished, the threat of social sanctions loses 
some of its power.  Prospective rural lenders would thus take borrowers’ migration 
options into account when deciding whether to extend an educational loan and, if so, for 
how much and to whom.  Put differently, informal financial market equilibria depend on 
migration incentives.  As a consequence, as the spatial differential in the returns to human 
capital grows, it may choke off informal financing of education in rural areas as lenders 
increasingly expect borrowers to migrate, making them greater risks for default. In this 
paper, we develop a theoretical model that demonstrates this explanation for the apparent 
underinvestment in rural education. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 builds the general 
structure of a simple two-period, dual economy model that parsimoniously captures the 
essence of the problem.  In section 3, we explore the implications of the model for 
patterns of educational investment and migration and examine the inefficiencies resulting 
from credit conditions that deviate from the first best world.  Section 4 discusses the 
policy implications of our findings and concludes. 
  
2 THE MODEL 
Consider a two-period dual economy.  In period one, the adult household head makes 
educational investment decisions in the children in the community (no one invests in 
children outside their own community).  Then, in period two, the (now grown) children 
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make residential/work decisions conditional on the human capital they accumulated in 
period one.   
The economy consists of two locations: A rural area with weak productive 
infrastructure that represents a more traditional mode of production and an urban area 
which represents settings enjoying better communications, power, transport and public 
services that underpin modern industrial and service economies. As such, returns to 
education are higher in the urban area.  We treat the differences in productive 
infrastructure across locations as exogenous and assume that human capital productivity 
is increasing in infrastructure.  This spatial variation in the returns to education generates 
incentives to migrate and geographic variation in private education investment, especially 
in the absence of perfect credit contract enforcement.i 
Assume there are Nj ,...,1=  households in the rural village, each with\ one adult 
decision maker and one child. Each adult decision maker is endowed with wealth jw and 
each child with a random assignment of some innate ability jα , where ].1,0[∈α  Given 
knowledge of the distribution of abilities across all children in the village, in period one 
the adults choose (non-cooperatively) how to split their wealth between educating their 
own children, investing in the education of other children in the village at a given net 
interest rate r, or holding it in the form of a composite, alternative asset that pays 
marginally less than r.ii  At the outset of period two, each now-adult child makes a 
decision as to where to live and work.  
As we are mainly concerned with demonstrating how migration induced by 
spatial differences in the returns to education leads to rural underinvestment in education 
by crippling informal finance mechanisms, we make some strong assumptions.  
Following Banerjee and Newman (1998), we assume that once an individual migrates, 
 6
they free themselves of their obligations to non-kin in their original, rural community.  
This assumed distinction between kin and non-kin derives from an observed, qualitative 
difference between taking advantage of distance and relative anonymity to default on 
informal loans provided by non-kin community members and the breaking of ties or 
responsibility to family.  In a comprehensive survey of the relevant literature, Remple 
and Lobdell (1978) find that a substantial majority of urban remittances go to the 
household of the migrant with village elders being the only non-kin that receive a 
significant share of remittances.  We incorporate this distinction into our model by 
allowing households to derive material or non-material (i.e., altruistic) benefits from their 
child’s income regardless of whether the child migrates. 
One way non-family community members can assure returns to their investment 
is by tracking down emigrants in urban areas and demanding repayment or reciprocity, 
such as using their home as a base for developing their own ties in the urban area.  While 
emigrants might default on their loan commitment, it is more difficult for them to 
completely escape traditional norms that call for hospitality and the provision of food and 
shelter to natal community members who request it.  In this way, emigrants can act as 
‘beachheads’ for the rural community, establishing a foundation that facilitates greater 
rural-urban interaction.  By utilizing emigrants for this purpose, community lenders can 
recoup some of their otherwise lost investment.   
But while lenders can tap into the benefits emigrants provide to recover part of 
their loans, the ‘beachhead’ effect alone does not alter a potential lender’s loan decision 
ex ante because community norms generally require the emigrant to oblige any natal 
community member who requires assistance in the city, not just those who have extended 
him credit in the past.  So long as emigrants cannot exclude any community members 
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from assistance, then each potential lender in the rural community has an incentive to free 
ride on the ‘beachhead’ opportunity sponsored by some other lender due to the non-
exclusivity of the service being offered.  In the interests of simplicity, we therefore 
assume away beachhead effects in our model, as they do not affect the qualitative results. 
2.1 The Child’s Problem 
We follow the standard solution technique of backward recursion, solving the 
child’s period two migration decision first, then solving the adults’ first period 
educational investment decision conditional on the child’s subsequent best response.  Let 
jiE denote the educational attainment of child j resulting from an investment by 
household iiii. Then let ∑
=
=
N
i
jjij Eh
1
)( α  be the level of human capital of child j, where 
∑
=
N
i
jiE
1
 represents the total level of education attained by child j by summing up the 
contribution of all households in the community to his education.  Thus we allow for a 
child to have any portion of his education financed by other households.  The labor 
productivity of a child with human capital jh is then given by the strictly concave, 
monotone and twice differentiable function )( jhρ . An individual whose productivity is 
)(hρ in the village has an increased productivity level )(hλρ in the city, where 1>λ  and 
reflects the higher returns to human capital in urban areas. 
In the event that their parent’s wealth is insufficient to cover their optimal level of 
education, children may have to seek educational loans in period one from other 
households.  In the absence of credit markets with perfect, exogenous contract 
enforcement, children can renege on these loans in period two.  For the sake of simplicity 
in the model, we assume that the child tries to renege on any loans received from other 
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households if and only if he migrates to the city.  This can provoke retribution, however, 
which, following Banerjee and Newman (1998), we model as maximal punishment from 
the village which serves to hold the migrants productive capacity to 0.iv  We denote as 
π−1  the probability of catching a reneging child.  Educated children will rationally 
migrate and renege on their educational loan contracts when there is significant spatial 
variation in the returns to education λ , the costs of migration c are low and enforcement 
of loan contracts is weak (i.e,π  is high).   
Suppose a child with human capital jh  stays in the village.  His net earnings will 
then be )( jhρ - ∑
≠
+
N
ji
jiE EPr)1( where r is the net interest rate and EP is the cost of a unit 
of education.v  Should the child decide to migrate, his expected gross earnings will be 
)( ihπλρ  and he incurs a migration cost, c.  The migration cost c incorporates both the 
financial costs of relocation as well as the social costs that result from a loss of social 
relationships that may be intrinsically as well as instrumentally important.  The child’s 
second period choice is thus quite simple:  
Max ( ∑
≠
+−
N
ji
jiEj EPrh )1()(ρ , )( ihπλρ - c)      (1) 
Adults make educational investments in children fully knowing this calculus of migration 
in which children will subsequently engage. 
2.2 Adult’s Problem. 
All the adults in the village can observe each child’s innate ability by the time they need 
to make educational investments.vi  In deciding how to allocate resources between 
educating their child and investing in the education of other children, an adult considers 
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the returns to each investment option, taking into consideration the possibility that 
children leave the area and subsequently renege on their loan contracts. 
Let ],...[ 1 Njjj EEE ≡  be the vector of educational units provided to each child 
],...,1[ Ni = by household j , and ],...[ 1 jNj
j EEE ≡ be the vector of all educational units 
received by child j from each household ],...,1[ Ni = .  Note that the first subscript indexes 
the child and the second the household.  The adult household head’s first period decision 
problem can then be characterized by 
jE
Max  j
N
ji
ijEE
N
i
ijj YEPrPEw δβδ +++− ∑∑
≠=
)1(
1
            )1,0(, ∈βδ   (2)  
subject to: Yj = Max ( )( jhρ - ∑
≠
+
N
ij
ijE EPr)1( , )( jhλρ - c)  (3) 
         jjE wEP ≤      (4) 
  chEEPrhE jiiiEjij +−−+− )()()1()([ πλρρ ] ≥  0  ji ≠∀   (5) 
where δ is a discount factor reflecting current valuation of lagged repayments and of the 
child’s future income.  Note that a household’s expenditure on the education of its own 
child indirectly affects its well being via the function Yδβ . The household’s utility 
increases in its child’s future productivity given by equation (3).  The function Yδβ  
flexibly accounts for parental investments in their children’s education due to any 
combination of material and nonmaterial (e.g., altruistic, status) purposes. 1<β  assures 
that parents do not receive more pleasure than their children from a certain amount of 
child’s income, and varying β changes the valuation households have for their children’s 
future earnings.  Equation (4) is just a budget constraint. 
The patterns of optimal investment that result are intuitive.  Households will 
invest in their own child as long as the increase in their well being resulting from a 
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marginal gain in their child’s productivity exceeds the opportunity cost of investing in 
another child from the community. An adult will only invest in a child from another 
household within the community if that child will repay his loan.  This creates an 
incentive compatibility constraint (ICC), reflected in equation (5), such that all children 
receiving educational loans will be educated only to the point that they have an incentive 
to migrate to the city and subsequently default on the loan.  As we will show, the 
incentive compatible level of education depends fundamentally on the spatial variation in 
returns to education, λ, the cost of migration, c, and the enforcement of loan contracts, as 
reflected in the probability that one can successfully renege on contracts by moving, π.  
The ICC for the optimization problem reflects the fact that if household j does not 
provide any funding for the education of child i≠ j, then it is indifferent to child j’s 
decision to migrate.  Wealthy households may want their own children to migrate after 
they are educated, but if they have invested in others’ children’s education, they will not 
want those children to leave. 
 
3  ANALYSIS 
We now analyze the factors that affect the educational outcomes of children and the 
educational investment decisions taken by adults. Specifically, we investigate how 
various educational financing schemes affect the optimal education levels in a dual 
economy setting and how rural educational investments vary in response to changes in 
the model’s parameters.  
To establish a basis for comparison, we first analyze the case in which children 
only receive educational funding from their own parents and characterize the conditions 
for migration and the optimal levels of education in each sector.  We then allow children 
 11
to receive informal loans from other households.  We show that the presence of an 
informal credit market weakly increases the educational attainment of all children but its 
efficiency is decreasing in the rate of out-migration.  Finally, we consider the case of a 
first-best world, where children can borrow on their future productivity from a formal 
credit market to finance their education. We make comparisons to show how informal 
credit markets can break down in the presence of migratory pressures and lead to 
underinvestment in education. 
3.1 Household-Funded Education 
In this first scenario, children’s education can only be funded by their own household.  
3.1.1 The Child’s Decision 
We begin by studying the child’s problem.  Suppose that child j receives all of his 
education from his own household j.  Then, from (1) we know that he will migrate if his 
total level of human capital jh implies 
     chh jj ≥− )()( ρλρ     (6) 
Let ),( ch λ denote the level of jh that solves equation (6) with equality.  This is the 
threshold level of human capital necessary to migrate.  Given that (.)ρ is strictly concave 
and monotonically increasing, we can apply the inverse-function theorem to establish: 
       0)()( <∂∂ λh        (7) 
and    0)()( >∂∂ ch      (8) 
Condition (7) says that as the urban/rural infrastructure ratio increases, the human 
capital threshold level decreases thus more people are likely to migrate.  Both within and 
across nations, actual migration patterns are overwhelmingly toward higher productivity 
regions.  Since, as we show, this leads to an unraveling of informal credit for education in 
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remote areas, spatial infrastructure differences can lead to educational poverty traps. 
Condition (8) simply indicates that as the cost of migration increases, the level of human 
capital required to migrate also increases. This wedge creates some modest, but bounded, 
spatial differences in incentives to invest in education.   
  Furthermore, since αEh = , the threshold level of education needed to induce 
migration hE =αα)( , is decreasing in natural ability:  
    0)())(( <∂∂ ααE     (9) 
Thus, everything else equal, high potential individuals are more likely to attain the 
threshold level and migrate, as reflected in “the brain drain” literature (Galor and Moav 
1999, Masson 2001, Stark 1984, 1999).  
3.1.2 Household Head’s Decision 
We now analyze the adult or household head’s first period problem. We first characterize 
the conditions under which an adult will spend all of her wealth on the education of her 
own child.  
 Recalling that, for the moment, we only permit the parent to pay for her child’s 
education, suppose child j migrates. Then, it must be the case that: 
    jjE wEP ≤       (10)   
 and  Ejjjj PrE )1()( +≥′ δααρδβλ  for jjj EE ≥        (11) 
That is, that the adult household head must at least have the level of wealth needed to 
educate her child such that, given his innate ability, his human capital 
is above the threshold level and, that for some level of education jjE above 
the threshold, the marginal benefit accruing to the household is larger than the 
opportunity cost. Let jEj EPw = denote the level of wealth a household requires in order 
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to be able to provide its child with the threshold level of education.  In addition, let jÊ  be 
such that (11) holds with equality. jÊ  represents the optimal level of education that a 
household j faced with an opportunity cost of EPr)1( +δ  would provide to its child 
conditional on the child migrating.  
We now characterize the set of children who will not migrate, i.e. for 
whom jj ww ≤ . In such a situation, the adult head will continue to spend on her child so 
long as jjE  satisfies 
  Ejjjj PrE )1()( +≥′ δααρδβ  where  jjj EE <   (12) 
This condition assures that at the level of education that exhausts the household’s 
wealth, the marginal benefit to the household from an increase in the child’s education in 
the rural area is greater than the opportunity cost of investing in the children of other 
households.  Let jE
~  solve (12) with equality. jE
~  represents the optimal level of 
education that a household j faced with an opportunity cost of EPr)1( +δ  would provide 
to its child given that the child will not attain the level of education needed to migrate 
(that is jj ww ≤  ).   
It is now a simple task to classify the set of all children who will migrate in 
an environment where a child could only look to his household to finance his 
education.  Given the set of all community-specific parameters λ and c, whether a child 
migrates or not depends entirely on his innate ability and the level of his household’s 
wealth.  Intra-community variation in migration and education patterns thus arise due to 
cross-sectional variation in initial endowments.  Recognize that due to the strict concavity 
of (.)ρ  the LHS of equation (12) is decreasing in E.  Then, since from equation (7) we 
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know that the threshold level of education, E , is decreasing in α , at low levels of innate 
ability α , E  gets larger than the optimal level of household provided education in the 
urban area Ê . Let Mα  be such that for all children j that satisfy 
M
j αα ≤ , Ê  is such that jj EE ≤ˆ , or similarly, that j
M EE ˆ)( =α .  Therefore, 
children with Mj αα ≤  will never migrate despite their household wealth.   
Figure 1 graphs the combination of educational levels and innate abilities that 
jointly determine a child’s educational attainment and subsequent locational choice in the 
second period conditional on λ and c.  For clarity, we call “potential” education the level 
of education that may be obtained if the household invested all its wealth in education, 
and distinguish it from “effective” education, the education level actually achieved by the 
child.  In the ),( Eα  space, potential education, or initial wealth endowment, is 
represented by an “o” sign, while effective education by a “+” sign. 
Suppose first that migration is not an option, and consider the EO~ schedule 
obtained from equation (12).  It represents the maximum educational level an adult will 
“invest” in his child if the child stays home.  In this case, all wealth endowments below 
the EO~  schedule correspond to cases where the adult will invest all his wealth in 
education (the marginal product remains higher than the opportunity cost). In other 
words, effective education is equal to potential education.  On the other hand, if the initial 
endowment is above the EO~  schedule, then only part of the household’s wealth is 
invested in education, and effective education is just equal to E~ . (the “+” lies below the 
corresponding “o”, indicating readiness to lend for other children’s education).   
The EO ˆ  schedule, implied by equation (11), has a similar interpretation, but for 
children who migrate.  As returns to education are higher in the city, this schedule strictly 
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dominates the former.  Both schedules represent the upper limits of effective education.  
Which schedule is relevant depends on the child’s location.  Those children whose 
effective education lies above the EE curve - which corresponds to equation (6) - will 
migrate, the other ones stay home.  This allows for the identification of the critical level 
of ability Mα where EO ˆ  and EE  intersect. The shaded area represents all cases where 
the entire household’s wealth is invested in the child’s education.  As such, for these 
wealth-rationed households, the effective education “+”and the potential education “o” 
coincide. 
3.1.3 The effect of spatial variation in productivity on education levels 
Suppose the urban sector underwent a period of heavy investment in its infrastructure, 
resulting in a relative increase in urban labor productivity.  Per equation (11),  an increase 
inλ  raises the marginal benefit of human capital thus resulting in higher Ê  for all levels 
of α .  Consequently, the threshold level of h  drops and, for any given α , so does E and 
therefore w .   Since EE M ˆ=α , a decrease in h  and an increase in Ê implies a decrease 
in Mα .  To summarize, we have that  0>∀α  
0)()ˆ( >∂∂ λE  (13)   and  0)()( <∂∂ λE  (14) 
Figure 2 graphically depicts the effect of increasing urban productivity on 
educational outcomes and migration rates.  As per equations (13) and (11) , we see that 
an increase in λ rotates EO ˆ  counter clockwise and shifts EE  down causing a decrease 
in Mα  from M0α  to 
M
1α .  The result is an increase in migration in so far as there exists at 
least one household j such that:  
jj Ew α0< , jj Ew α1>  and 1Êw j ≤   (15) 
Condition (15) corresponds to the shaded area in Figure 2. It represents all those 
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children for whom the increase in λ lifted wealth and/or ability constraints enough to 
make migration attractive.  Note that even though their level of education remains the 
same, they now migrate and thus earn higher wages for any given level of human capital.  
There will, however, still be those children whose ability and/or household wealth 
endowment is too low to migrate.  Living in a poor household can result in a large, 
discontinuous reduction in the optimal education that a child receives.  The extent of this 
disparity increases with increasing spatial disparity in productivity.  To summarize, as λ  
increases, the differences between rural and urban optimal household sponsored 
education (for any given level of α ) increases. That is, 0)()~ˆ( >∂−∂ λEE . 
This coincides with the well known phenomenon that as urban centers in 
developing nations develop at a faster pace than their rural counterparts, the socio-
economic disparity between urban elites and rural elites grows, reflected here in terms of 
increasing optimal levels of education in urban areas only. This does not mean that all, or 
even most of the urban dwellers achieve this level of education. Indeed, increased relative 
productivity in the urban area increases the rate of migration by loosening the lower 
boundaries on the ability and wealth constraints. This means that the urban area begins to 
attract relatively more skill-poor individuals as well as individuals coming from low 
wealth households. It is therefore safe to conjecture that such a dynamic not only 
increases the urban-rural polarization but also results in increasing within-urban 
inequalities as well.  We leave that topic for future extensions of the model.   
3.2 Informal Credit Market 
Thus far we have restricted our attention to the case in which a child’s education 
is financed solely by its own household.  While this is interesting in its own right, we are 
most interested in understanding the relationship between spatial variation in the returns 
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to human capital and the financing of educational investments.  We now move on to 
analyze a household’s decision to invest in other children. 
3.2.1 The Supply of Community Funded Education 
 We first characterize the conditions under which a household will supply 
educational loans for investment purposes and a child will demand such loans. We 
assume that the return on investment is independent of the child so long as the child 
remains in the village.  The investor is assured of )1( r+  from non-migrantsvii.  The child 
is similarly indifferent as to who in the community provides the loans.  These 
assumptions allow us to focus on a representative household whose adult can supply 
investment loans to a community fund and whose child can apply for educational loans 
from the same fund. To this end, let ∑
≠
− =
ji
ji
j EE  denote the sum total of educational 
loans that child j receives from the community.  Recall from the ICC that for a 
community household to invest in a child j it must be the case that for 0>− jE  
j
E
j
jjj
j
jjj EPrcEEEE
−−− +−≤+−+ )1())(())(( αραπλρ  (16) 
This condition assures the lending household(s) that the recipient child will not migrate 
and thus renege on his loan.  The contract is designed so that at the incentive compatible 
levels of educational investment, the expected net gain from migration is less than the net 
gain resulting from the opportunity to default on the loan. Let jE −&& solve (16) with 
equality. jE −&& then represents the maximum amount of education child j will be eligible to 
receive from the community.  This is critical to the hypothesis we advanceviii.  Allowing 
for educational loans shifts the migration threshold since migration effectively generates 
windfall earnings in the form of loan non-repayments.  The incentive compatible 
threshold level shifts relative to the household financed threshold in response to the size 
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of loan taken (and thus the magnitude of gains from reneging) as well as the probability 
of getting caught.  The lower the risk of being caught and the larger the loan, the lower 
will be the threshold as lenders adjust for the increased attractiveness of migration. 
To provide a clear picture of the determinants of jE −&& , we graph condition (16) in figure 3   
and run some comparative statistics to analyze how shifts in the model’s parameters 
affect it.  Recall that the RHS of (16) captures the net cost of migration. When 0=− jE , 
the net cost is simply the parameter c. However as jE −   increases, the net cost decreases 
at the rate EPr)1( +  (as migrating now provides the added benefit of freeing the 
individual from his debt burden). Thus the net cost curve intersects the vertical axis at c 
and slopes downward thereafter. The LHS of (16) crosses the vertical axis below c.ix  
Since both functions are strictly concave, and thus their difference is also strictly 
concave, then for any given jjE , )(()1(
j
jjj EE
−+− αρπλ  is increasing in jE − .  jE −&& is the 
value where the productivity gains equal the net costs.  . 
Recall that π  denotes the probability that a reneging child escapes attempts by the 
community to punish him for breaking the agreement to honor his loans.  For large π , 
migrants find it relatively easy to avoid punishment. A rural household with surplus 
investable resources will rationally seek to protect itself from potentially bad investments.  
As figure 4 shows, because an increase in π  shifts up the expected gain of migrating, it 
lowers jE −&& , reducing the supply of informal educational loans 
j
E EP
−&& .  
A similar graphical representation explains the decrease in jE −&&  resulting from an 
increase inλ . Again, this is merely the rational response of adults protecting their 
investments in the face of an increased incentive to migrate.  On the other hand, in a 
community with strong networks systems and in which personal welfare is inextricably 
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linked to social status, the resulting increase in the cost of moving is likely to relax the 
constraint of loan provision arising from the fear of losing investments to migration. 
These results highlight the centerpiece of our hypothesis:  For a child j tapping into 
community educational loans, as the expected benefit of migration increases (captured by 
either an increase in π  and/or λ ¸ or a decrease in c), the maximum amount of loans the 
community is willing to provide, jE −&& , decreases.  That is, 0)()( <∂∂ − λjE&& , 
0)()( <∂∂ − πjE&& , 0)()( >∂∂ − cE j&& . 
The return on educational investment is given by )1( r+ . One would expect that 
increases in investment returns arising from an increase in the going interest rate would 
increase jE EP
−&& , the amount of loans the community is willing to give for each α . 
However, in this case, an increase in the return to investment signifies a larger debt 
burden per level of education for the child and thus increases his incentive to migrate and 
renege.  As such,  increases in the net  return on educational investment  r result in a 
decrease of jE −&& , the maximum level of education the community is willing to invest in 
any child j.  That is, 0)()( <∂∂ − rE j&& . 
Figure 5 shows this result. An increase in r represents a steeper slope on the net 
cost to migration curve which then intersects the expected net gain to migration curve at a 
lower jE −&& . 
3.2.2 The Demand for Community Funded Education 
As a result of the fixed rate of repayment )1( r+  that an investor receives per unit 
of education financed if the child remains in the rural area, the investor may be willing to 
invest in a child beyond the level that optimizes the child’s productivity.  The child, 
however, will reject all loans whose repayment cost is greater than the resulting increase 
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in productivity.  Recall that jE
~  was child j’s optimal level of education if he stayed in the 
rural area and only received education from his household.  Now, however, we seek to 
find the child’s demand for community provided educational loans. Given an optimal 
level of education provided by his own household, *jjE , child j will accept any level of 
community funded educational units jE −  that satisfies  
   Ej
j
jjj PrEE )1())((
* +≥+′ − ααρ     (17) 
Let jE −
r
solve (17) with equality.  jE −
r
 then denotes child j’s optimal demand for 
community funded education.  If community willingness to supply educational loans to 
child j is greater than the child’s demand for education, i.e.  jj EE −− ≥
r
&& , then child j’s 
total educational attainment will be jjj EE
−+
r
* and will not be constrained by the 
contractual demands of the informal credit market structure.  If on the other 
hand jj EE −− <
r
&& , then the child will receive a total education attainment of jjj EE
−+ &&* .  
Note that from equations (12) and (17) we have that 
   Ejjj PrE )1()
~( +=′ δααρδβ     (18) 
   and Ej
j
jjj PrEE )1())((
* +=+′ − ααρ
r
   (19) 
By the strict concavity of (.)ρ , it follows that 
    jjjj EEE
−+<
r
*~     (20) 
Thus, for any child j for whom 0<jα  and who does not migrate, 0>
− jE
r
 and they 
demand a positive level of community funded education.x  This is true because while a 
child absorbs the full return from increased productivity resulting from more education, 
the ensuing indirect increase in the household’s utility is discounted by β .  Furthermore, 
the household head must factor in the opportunity cost of foregone investment. 
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 Whether a child’s level of community funded education is constrained by the 
amount of education the community is willing to finance or by the level of education they 
demand depends on the child’s endowment of ability and his household’s wealth.  More 
specifically, any child who demands an education level that would make migration a 
rational second-period decision will be constrained by the supply of community 
educational loans available to him.  Unlike the household-only funding scenario in which 
any child with Mα≤α  would never rationally migrate, any child with 0>α  will migrate 
under informal community level provision if they receive sufficient loans because 
migration now has the added benefit of offering an opportunity to renege on one’s debt 
burden.  That opportunity becomes more inviting as the probability of getting caught 
)1( π− decreases, and the marginal cost of education EPr)1( +  increases.  
jE −&& , the 
maximum loan amount available for a child j endowed with jα  , is thus decreasing in α , 
though  even with 1j =α , a child j will always have access to a positive supply of 
community loansxi. Meanwhile, a child’s demand for education, and thus for educational 
loans if his household has insufficient wealth to pay for his schooling, is monotonically 
increasing in α .  Figure 6 depicts the demand and supply of community education as a 
function of α . 
The bold sections of the demand and supply schedules represent the actual 
community funding jE −  that child j will receive.  All those children with *α≤α will 
receive their optimal level of education while children with *α>α  will be constrained by 
the amount of loan the community is willing to finance.xii The striking implication is that  
in a world of imperfectly enforceable credit contracts and migration options, children are 
implicitly punished for being born intelligent.  High innate ability increases the benefits 
to migration, inducing rational investors to reduce their loan supply as a defense against 
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prospective default.  This perverse result yields an important, testable hypothesis for 
future work: are educational loans increasing in innate ability, as would be the case under 
perfect credit markets (as the next subsection demonstrates) or under altruistic lending 
(wherein lenders give in response to child demand), or are they decreasing in a child’s 
innate ability, as predicted by this model?   
We built our model of the informal credit market without considering the actual 
availability of community resources to meet their willingness to invest in the education of 
each child j, ( jE −&& ). We modeled a perfectly endowed community financier who is always 
capable of meeting the demand ( jE −
r
) subject only to the incentive compatibility 
constraint. Whether this condition is met depends on the distribution and aggregate level 
of wealth across households and the distribution of abilities across children in the 
community.  A community poorly endowed with wealth but richly endowed with 
intelligence is likely to have many loan worthy children demanding loans who 
nonetheless come up short due to the low level of investible surplus in the community.  
This simple model captures the key elements of our story: that informal financing weakly 
dominates the household-only provision of education under any distribution of α and w , 
and that spatial disparities in returns to human capital reduce the available supply of 
educational loans. 
3.3 The First-Best World 
The benefits of informal financing are also sharply limited by financial market 
imperfections.  We now demonstrate this by briefly describing the first-best 
counterfactual in order to formalize the inefficiencies that result from an imperfect credit 
market and to show how spatial differences in infrastructure affect those inefficiencies 
 While we have shown that informal credit is better than no credit, clearly the 
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incentive compatibility constraint on the provision of informal loans results in 
inefficiencies.  We investigate these inefficiencies by comparison with a complete, 
competitive credit market with perfect contract enforcement. In such a world, children 
would have to repay loans irrespective of their second period locational choice. 
Therefore, child j migrates only if 
cEPrEEEPrEE jE
j
jjj
j
E
j
jjj ++−+<+−+
−−−− )1())(()1())(( ** αλραρ  (21) 
Since the child has to repay the same amount in both sectors, receiving loans does 
not change the threshold level and child j will migrate if j
j
jj EEE >+
−* .  Thus migration 
thresholds are endogenous to lending patterns only in the presence of imperfect financial 
markets due to contract enforcement problems.  Whether the child actually migrates 
depends on whether there exists jE −  such that 
j
j
jj EEE >+
−*   and  Ej
j
jjj PrEE )1())((
* +≥+′ − ααρλ   (22) 
Condition (22) assures that child j’s sum total education is greater than the threshold for 
migration and that the amount jE −  of his education that was formally financed provides 
net benefits to him at the margin. Let jE −
(
equate (22).  jE −
(
is the unconstrained optimal 
level of education for child j.  In a first best world, all rural children for whom 
j
j
jj EEE >+
−(*  will migrate and borrow the amount needed to fund jE −
(
 units of 
education. If j
j
jj EEE ≤+
−(* , then child j would never migrate and thus reverts to making 
his borrowing decision conditional on staying in the rural area.  This corresponds to him 
borrowing the amount jE −  that equates (17) and thus, the first best optimal level of rural 
education is exactly equal to the optimal demand for community funded education jE −
r
.  
It follows that all children j who don’t migrate and satisfy jj EE −− ≤ &&
v
 receive their first-
best level of credit financed education even under a regime of informal credit markets.  
 24
For those children j such that jj EE −− > &&
v
however, the introduction of formal credit 
markets will allow them to take the amount of loans that will fund their optimal level of 
education.  As they were previously subject to the incentive compatibility constraint 
necessary in an informal financing regime, a release of this constraint means that all such 
children will now migrate. 
 Improving loan contract enforcement in the rural area also improves the 
educational outcomes of children who subsequently migrate.  Using equations (11) and 
(22) and conducting the same exercise that led to equation (20), it follows that  
    jjjj EEE
−+<
(*ˆ     (23) 
And by a similar argument to the proof in footnote 13, we find that:  Any child j that 
migrates will demand a positive level of education loans from the credit market and 
will attain a level of education greater than his optimal level of household financed 
education jÊ .  That is, for all j such that j
j
jj EEE >+
−(* , 0>− jE
(
 and 
j
j
jj EEE ˆ
* >+ −
(
. 
Moreover, there also exist children who can migrate (and thus achieve their full 
potential) only if they have access to a formal credit market.  From a rearranging of 
equation (22) we get 
   
jj
Ej
jj
PrEE
αλα
ρ 1))1((1'* +=+ −−
(
   (24) 
Since the RHS of (24) is a constant for each j, this implies a one to one tradeoff between 
*
jjE  and 
jE −
(
.  Whereas, child j (should he migrate) will always attain a total level of 
education equal to jjj EE
−+
(*  in the first-best world, how much he actually borrows to 
finance his education will depend on the amount *jjE  that his household contributes to his 
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education.  However, though this will affect the gross income that a child earns, it will 
not affect the level of education he will attain.  Indeed, should a child j come from a 
household of zero wealth, he will simply borrow enough to finance 
jj
EPr
αλα
ρ 1))1((1' +−  
units of education.  It follows that the only condition child j has to satisfy to migrate is 
that j
j EE >−
(
.  This depends solely on his innate ability jα . Household wealth is no 
longer a factor in a child’s decision to migrate. In addition, introduction of perfect credit 
markets also lowers the threshold level of innate ability needed to migrate.  To see this, 
recall that Mα is such that j
M EE ˆ)( =α .  From equation (24) it follows that  
j
jj
M EEE −+<
(*)(α   (25) 
 Denote the level of α that equates (26) as FBα .  Since )(αE is strictly 
decreasing in α , it follows that MFB αα < .  To summarize, the provision of a formal 
market for credit increases the rate of migration by making the migration decision 
independent of household wealth and lowering the threshold level of innate ability 
needed to migrate. 
 Figure 7 graphs the preceding results. The schedules E
(
0  and E
v
0   
obtained from equations (22) and (17) represent the optimal education levels for a child 
who migrates and one who remains in the rural area respectively.  The analytical 
expressions of these curves are almost identical to Ê0  and E~0  respectively from figure 
1, but for the absence of parameter β .  As the migration conditions remain unchanged, 
educational attainment for all children is represented by the bold segments of the two 
curves 
 In summary,  perfect credit markets provide Pareto optimal education financing.  
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They increase the optimal level of education and of available educational credit for all but 
the lowest ability children who would remain in the rural village regardless.  Perfectly 
enforceable credit contracts also yield an optimal spatial distribution of individuals.  
Absent first-best credit markets, informal credit provides a means for certain rural 
children to overcome the constraints of household financing and receive a better 
education.  But informal credit fails to meet the needs of higher ability children from low 
wealth households, creating important inefficiencies and inequities. 
 
4  DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The central results of our model highlight three key points.  First, we demonstrate the 
consequences of spatial inequality in productive infrastructure for rural education 
investment in an environment of imperfect credit markets.  Spatially varied returns to 
education tighten the incentive compatibility constraints inherent to informal credit 
markets and thereby limit the usefulness of informal educational loans.  Second, our 
model underscores the crucial importance of the presence of credit contract enforcement 
mechanisms for the optimal investment in and attainment of education. Perfectly 
enforceable education loans afford children the opportunity to realize their full potential 
and to break free of poverty traps caused by low household wealth endowments.  This 
does not carry over fully to imperfectly enforceable informal financing. 
 If increasing educational attainment in less-favored rural communities, perhaps 
especially among high ability children, is an objective for policymakers, then our analysis 
suggests two possible means by which public investment might “crowd in” private 
educational investment.  First, governments and donors might improve rural 
infrastructure in ways that encourage private business investment that stimulates skilled 
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employment and thereby raises the expected returns to human capital.  This might include 
programs of rural electrification, improvements in rural communication infrastructure, 
road improvement and maintenance, and provision of police protection.  Improving rural 
infrastructure reduces incentives to migrate out of rural villages, making informal loan 
contract enforcement easier and thereby increasing the provision of private, informal 
finance.  Second, governments and donors can invest in credit contract enforcement, 
perhaps through credit reporting bureaus or improved juridical enforcement of contracts.  
Third, and perhaps the most worrying implication of our model, is that increasing 
spatial inequality in productive infrastructure is accompanied by a weakened ability of 
community social norms to ensure contract compliance.  Without any significant 
improvements in formal contract enforcement mechanisms, we would expect to see 
increased incentives for rural-to-urban migration, but with the relatively wealthy 
increasingly disproportionately able to capitalize on these opportunities as informal 
finance for education becomes increasingly difficult to obtain in rural villages.  More 
poor children of high innate ability thus become consigned to a sort of low-education 
poverty trap of the sort first posited by Loury (1981). 
  It would be instructive to expand on this model to allow for dynamics in 
order to explore the potential divergence of rural and urban livelihoods and the 
prospective intergenerational reproduction of poverty.  Indeed, as poorer and less skilled 
individuals tend to remain in the rural area, we would expect that spatial mobility 
combined with imperfect credit markets would yield over time a rural population with a 
distribution of innate abilities and wealth that results in a decreased rate of migration and 
a low steady-state level of rural educational attainment and productivity. The simple two-
period model we have developed nonetheless provides a credible answer to the puzzle of 
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underinvestment of education in rural areas based on the twin empirical regularities of 
spatially varied returns to human capital and imperfect loan contract enforcement in rural 
credit markets. 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1:  Educational Outcomes and Migration Level  
Conditioned on Child Intelligence and Household Wealth 
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Figure 2: Effect of Increasing Urban Productivity on Educational Outcome and Migration Rate 
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Figure 3: Determinants of Maximum Level of Community Financed Education 
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Figure 4:  Response of Community Financed Education to Increases in Urban Productivity and 
Ease of Default. 
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Figure 5:  Response of Community Funded Education to Decreases in Costs of Migration 
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Figure 6:  Demand and Supply of Community Funded Education 
 
 
 
α10
EPr
c
)1( +
E
*α
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 33
Figure 7: Effect of Formalizing Credit Markets on Educational Outcomes and Migration Rates 
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NOTES 
 
i We focus on the rural economy and use the urban area only as a magnet for migrant laborers from the 
village.  In our framework, it would never be rational for an urban dweller to migrate to the rural area, 
given the decreased return on their human capital that would result. 
ii This composite alternative asset serves just as a benchmark against which educational investments are 
measured. 
iii A household indexed by j denotes the household in which a child j under analysis is attached to.  A 
household indexed by i denotes any other household in the community where i≠j. 
iv By driving a defaulter’s income to zero, no lender would ever fund a migrating child so informal finance 
flows only to non-migrating children.  Our main aim, to show that migration options reduce the loan pool 
for education, is robust to this simplifying assumption.   
v A child does not have to explicitly repay education financed by his parents.  This allows for an adult’s 
decisions on their children’s education to involve additional considerations beyond merely material 
investment returns.  
vi As primary education is often free or subsidized, the need for educational investments arises mainly at the 
secondary level making this a tenable assumption. 
vii We assume the existence of other investment possibilities that in equilibrium establish the opportunity 
cost of capital, r. 
viii Note that the supply of loans jE −&& for a child j is calculated after household j decides how much to invest 
in their children’s education jjE *  , independently from lending or borrowing options. Then, starting from 
the optimal educational expenses provided by the household, informal (or formal) lending may take place. 
ix We know that 0>− jE implies that jjj EE < .  Thus, since jE is such that ( ,)()1( cEjj =− αρλ then 
for 0=− jE and )1,0(∈π , it follows that cjEjEj <
−+− )(()1( αρλπ . 
 
x One can prove this as follows.  Suppose not.  Then 0=− jE
r
.  Equation (21) then implies that 
*~
jjj EE < .  This is a contradiction since given that the optimal level of household funded rural education 
is jE
~
, it must be that .~* jjj EE ≤   It follows that .0>jE
v
 
xi This result follows from the definition of jE  and jE&& .  jE  is such that c)E()1( jj =αρ−λ  and 
jE −&&  
solves jE
j
jj EP)r1(c))EE(()1(
−− +−=+αρ−λπ &&&& .  Let 1j =α  and ).1,0(∈π  Suppose 0E
j =−&& , 
this implies that cE jj =− )()1( αρλ , and cE jj =− )()1( αρλπ .  This is a contradiction and thus 
0E j >−&& . 
xii The low-density exception are children of households whose wealth and resulting investment choices 
bring the child nearly to the migration threshold, but a single unit of community-financed education would 
provide education sufficient to make it worth the child’s while to migrate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
